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Abstract
We give a 3
2
-approximation algorithm for stable matchings that runs in O(m) time.
The previously best known algorithm by McDermid has the same approximation ratio but
runs in O(n3/2m) time, where n denotes the number of people and m is the total length
of the preference lists in a given instance. Also the algorithm and the analysis are much
simpler. We sketch the extension of the algorithm for computing stable many-to-many
matchings.
1 Introduction
In the paper we consider a variant of the problem called Stable Matchings, known also in
the literature as Stable Marriage. The problem is defined as follows. We are given two
sets W and U of women and men and each woman w of W has a linearly ordered preference
list Lw of a subset of men U
′
w ⊆ U and similarly each man m of U has a linearly ordered
preference list Lm of a subset of women W
′
m ⊆ W . The lists of men and women can contain
ties, which are subsets of men (or respectively women), which are equally good for a given
woman (resp. man). Thus if m and m′ are on list Lw of woman w, then either (1) m <w m
′
and then we say that woman w prefers m to m′ or that m is better for her than m′ or (2)
m ≡w m′, which means that m and m′ are in a tie on Lw and then we say that w is indifferent
between m and m′ or that m and m′ are equally good for her or (3) m′ <w m. If man m
does not belong to list Lw, then we say that m is unacceptable for w. A matching is a
set of pairs (m,w) such that m ∈ U,w ∈ W and m and w are on each other’s preference lists
and each man/woman belongs to at most one pair. If (m1, w1) belongs to a certain matching
M1, then we write M1(m1) = w1, which means that in M1 woman w1 is a partner of m1
and analogously that M1(w1) = m1. If man m (or woman w) is not contained in any pair of
matching M , then we say that m (w) is unmatched or single or free in M . A matching M1
is called stable if it does not admit a blocking pair. A pair (m,w) is blocking for M1 if (0)
m and w are acceptable to each other and (1) m is single or prefers w to M1(m) and if (2) w is
single or prefers m to M1(w). Each instance of the problem can be represented by a bipartite
graph G = (U ∪W,E) with vertices U representing men and verices W women and edges E
connecting all mutually acceptable pairs of men and women. The problem we are interested in
in this paper is that of finding a stable matching that has the largest cardinality. The version
in which there are no ties in the preference lists of men and women has been long known and
an algorithm by Gale and Shapley ([1]) solves it exactly in O(m) time, where m denotes the
sum of the lengths of preference lists. In the version without ties a stable matching always
exists and every stable matching has the same cardinality. If we allow ties, as in the problem
we consider in this paper, then a stable matching also always exists and can be found via the
Gale/Shapley algorithm by breaking ties arbitrarily. However, the sizes of stable matchings
∗Supported by MNiSW grant number N N206 1723 33, 2007-2010.
can vary considerably and the problem of finding a stable matching of maximum cardinality
is NP -hard, which was shown by Manlove et al. in [9]. Therefore it is desirable to devise an
approximation algorithm for the problem.
Previous results Previous approximation algorithm were presented in [9],[4], [5], [6], [7]. Cur-
rently the best approximation algorithm is by McDermid [10] and achieves the approximation
guarantee 32 . Its running time is O(n
3/2m), where n denotes the number of vertices and m the
number of edges. Inapproximabilty results were shown in [2], [3], [11].
Our results We give a 3/2-approximation algorithm that runs in O(m) time and addition-
ally is significantly simpler than that of McDermid. We sketch the extension of the algorithm
for computing stable many-to-many matchings, which runs in O(mlogc) time, where c de-
notes the minimum of the maximal capacities in each side of the bipartition. In particular it
means we give an O(m)-time algorithm for the Hospitals-Residents problem, improving on an
O(d5/2n3/2m) time algorithm given by McDermid, where d denotes the maximal capacity of
a hospital. Since the problems are said to have many practical applications, we believe our
algorithms will be of help.
2 Algorithm
Let Mopt denote an optimal (i.e. largest) stable matching and M,M
′ any two matchings. We
say that e is an M -edge if e ∈M . A path P or a cycle C is called alternating (with respect
to M) if its edges alternate between M -edges and edges of E \ M . It is well known from
matching theory (see [8] for example) that M ⊕M ′ can be partitioned into a set of alternating
paths and alternating cycles. (For two sets X,Y , the set X ⊕ Y denotes X \ Y ∪ Y \X.) Let
S denote a set of alternating paths and cycles of M ⊕Mopt. Consider any alternating cycle
c of S or any alternating path p of even length of S. Then both c and p contain the same
number of M -edges and Mopt-edges. Consider an alternating path p of length 2k + 1 of S.
Then either
|Mopt∩p|
|M∩p| =
k+1
k or
|M∩p|
|Mopt∩p|
= k+1k . Therefore if M ⊕Mopt does not contain paths
of length 3 with the middle edge of a path being an M -edge, then |Mopt| ≤ 32 |M | and M is a
3
2 approximation of Mopt. To achieve a
3
2 -approximation we will be eliminating such potential
paths of length 3 of M ⊕Mopt.
Accordingly we define a dangerous path, which is an alternating path P = (w,m1, w1,m)
such that w and m are unmatched (which means that (m1, w1) is in M and (w,m1), (w1,m) do
not belong to M) and (m1, w1) is not a blocking pair for matching M
′ = {(w,m1), (w1,m)}.
Let us notice that if P is a dangerous path, then either m1 is indifferent between w and w1
(and then we say that (w,m1) is an equal edge) or w1 is indifferent between m and m1 (and
then (w1,m) is called an equal edge) or both. Thus a dangerous path contains one or two
equal edges. If an edge e = (w,m1) is equal, then we say that P is a masculine dangerous
path and if (w1,m) is equal, then we say that P is a feminine dangerous path. A path P
can of course be both a masculine and feminine dangerous path.
We also introduce the following terminology. If man m is matched to woman w and there
is at least one free woman w1 such that w and w1 are equally good for m, then we say that
m is unstable and that w1 is a satellite of m. If woman w is matched to an unstable man
m, then we say that w is unstable. If e = (m,w) is such that w is free and m is either free
or matched to w′, who is equally good for him as w and there is at least one free woman w1
such that w and w1 are equally good for m, then e is called special. An edge (m,w) is said
to be blocking if m,w are a blocking pair. An edge (m,w) is said to be unstable if m is free
and w is unstable. Let us notice that if (m,w) is unstable, then it is a part of a masculine
dangerous path. An edge (m,w) that is equal and such that m is free is called f-equal. An
edge e is said to be bad if it is blocking or unstable or f-equal.
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In the algorithm given below set X contains single men that have not yet proposed to all
women on their lists (and potentially belong to blocking pairs or masculine dangerous paths)
and set F contains single men, who have already proposed to all women on their lists and
potentially belong to feminine dangerous paths.
Algorithm GS Modified
Each man m’s preference list Lm is organized in such a way that if Lm contains a tie t = (w1, w2, . . . , wk),
then free women in t come before matched women in t. At the beginning all women are free and ties are broken
arbitrarily and in the course of running the algorithm whenever woman w becomes matched for the first time we move
her to the end of every tie she belongs to.
X := U (all men)
F := ∅
while X or F is nonempty
if there is a man m ∈ X , then
if Lm = ∅, then remove m from X and if L′m 6= ∅, add m to F
else
w ← next woman on m’ s list Lm
if (m,w) is not special, then remove w from Lm
if (m,w) is blocking, then
add M(w) to X
M ← M ∪ (m,w) \ (w,M(w))
remove m from X
else if w is unstable, then
let w′ be a satellite of M(w)
if (M(w), w′) is special, remove w′ from LM(w)
M ← M ∪ {(m,w), (M(w), w′)} \ (w,M(w))
remove m from X
else if (m,w) is f-equal, then add w to the end of list L′m.
else
there is a man m ∈ F
if L′m = ∅, remove m from F
else
w ← next woman on m’ s list L′m
remove w from L′m
if (m,w) is f-equal, then
add M(w) to X
M ← M ∪ (m,w) \ (w,M(w))
First we show how Algorithm GS Modified runs on the following example. Suppose the pref-
erence lists of men m1,m2,m3 and women w1, w2, w3 are as follows. The brackets indicate ties.
m1 : (w1, w2) w3
m2 : w1 w3 w2
m3 : w2 w1 w3
w1 : m1 m2 m3
w2 : m3 m1 m2
w3 : m1 m2 m3
Suppose that m1 starts. m1 proposes to w1 and gets accepted ((m1, w1) is a special edge
and w2 is a satellite of m1). Now suppose that it is m2’s turn to propose. (It might also be
m3.) m2 proposes to w1 and gets accepted because w1 is unstable. m1 gets matched with w2.
m3 proposes to w2 and gets accepted. m1 proposes to w1 (as (m1, w1) was a special edge) and
gets accepted. m2 proposes to w3 and gets accepted.
If we break ties arbitrarily and run the Gale/Shapley algorithm, then the cardinality of
the computed matching depends on the order in which we break ties and the order in which
men propose. Algorithm GS Modified outputs a matching that would have been output by the
GS algorithm if the order of ties and proposals of men were as follows. It would be identical
to that in Algorithm GS Modified but for two things: (1) if m proposes to w, (m,w) is not
blocking, w is unstable, w′ is a satellite of M(w), then a tie in the list of LM(w) would be
broken so that w′ would come before w (whereas in Algorithm GS Modified w comes before
w′) and thus M(w) would propose first to w′ and not w, (2) if m ∈ F and (m,w) is f-equal,
then m would propose to w before M(w).
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Now we prove the correctness of Algorithm GS Modified.
Fact 1 If woman w becomes matched, then she will stay matched. Woman w can become
unstable only the first time someone proposes to her. If an unstable woman w (matched to
some unstable man m) becomes matched to some new man m′, then she is not unstable any
more. If woman w is matched to man m and is not unstable, then she will always be matched
to someone at least as good for her as m.
Proof. If w is matched and m proposes to her, then there is no free woman w′ who is equally
good for m as w (because then m would propose to w′ before proposing to w). As a result
if w becomes matched to m she will not become unstable and she will cease to be unstable if
she was before. Also if w is matched and not unstable at the moment m proposes to her, she
accepts him only if m is not worse for her than her current partner M(w). ✷
Lemma 1 If e is special at some step of Algorithm GS Modified and gets added to M , then it
will not become special later. Suppose that at some step S of Algorithm GS Modified edge e is
incident with a single man m. If at step S edge e is not bad, then it will not become bad later.
If at step S edge e is f-equal and not unstable, then e will not become unstable or blocking. If
e is bad but not special at step S and gets added to M , then it will not become bad later in the
course of running the algorithm.
Proof. If at step S edge e = (m,w) is special and gets added to M , then it means that w
becomes matched and by Fact 1 she will always stay matched, therefore e will never become
special.
If e = (m,w) is not bad, then w is matched to some man m′. Since e is not unstable,
then w is not unstable and thus by Fact 1 w will not become unstable, thus e will not become
unstable. If w prefersm′ tom, since she is not unstable, she will always be matched to someone
she prefers to m, thus e will not become blocking. If for w men m and m′ are equally good,
but e is not an equal edge, then it means that m′ has no free woman incident on him at the
moment and thus will never have and if w gets matched to m′′, then m′′ will be better for her
than m′, because w could become matched to m′′ that is equally good for her as m′ only if
(w,m′) belonged to a feminine dangerous path.
If at step S edge e = (m,w) is f-equal and not unstable, then it means that w is matched
to some man m′ such that m and m′ are equally good for her and w is not unstable. Thus
by Fact 1 she will not become unstable and she will always be matched to someone at least as
good for her as m′.
Suppose that at step S edge e = (m,w) is bad but not special and e gets added to M . Then
by Fact 1 w will never become unstable (note that at step S she might have been unstable)
and will always stay matched to m or will become matched to someone at least as good for
her as m. Thus e will not become unstable or blocking later. If she gets matched to m′, who
is equally good for her as m, then it means that at that step, (m,w) belonged to a femine
dangerous path and thus m′ had not (and thus will never have) a free woman incident on him
(because then he would have proposed to her as he would have been blocking because of a
free woman incident on him), which means that (w,m′) never becomes a part of a feminine
dangerous path, therefore e will not become f-equal. ✷
Theorem 1 Algorithm GS Modified computes computes a stable matching M that does not
contain dangerous alternating paths and thus is a 32 - approximation algorithm. Algorithm GS
Modified runs in O(m) time.
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Proof. Suppose that matching M computed by the algorithm is not stable. Then it contains
a blocking edge (m,w). Thus m is either single or matched to woman w′, who is worse for him
than w. Therefore at some step of the algorithm m must have proposed to w. If at that step
(m,w) was blocking, it got added to M and by Lemma 1, (m,w) could not become blocking
later and if it was not blocking, it also could not become blocking later.
For 32 -approximation, it suffices to show that the graph does not contain dangerous paths. If
the graph contains a masculine or feminine dangerous path, then it contains an edge e = (m,w),
that is unstable or f-equal. But then at some step of the algorithm m proposed to w and if e
was not unstable or f-equal then, by Lemma 1 it could not become unstable or f-equal later. If
it was unstable at that step it got added to M and also could not become unstable or f-equal
later. If it was f-equal, w was added to L′m and e was considered again at some later step and
either it got added to M because it still was f-equal or not because it was not and by Lemma
1 could not become f-equal later.
The running time of the algorithm is proportional to the total length of lists Lm and L
′
m.
Each edge of Lm is scanned at most twice - twice, only if the first time it was scanned, it was
special and each edge of L′m is scanned at most once. ✷
3 Extension to stable b-matchings
Suppose we have a bipartite graph G = (V,E), where V = U ∪W and U,W are disjoint sets,
and a function b : V → N . Then a subset M ⊆ E is called a b-matching if for each v ∈ V it is
degM (v) ≤ b(v), where degM (v) denotes the degree of vertex v in a graph GM = (U ∪W,M).
We will call vertices of U - U -agents and vertices of W - W -agents. Each U -agent u of U
has a linearly ordered preference list Lu of a subset of W -agents W
′
u ⊆W possibly containing
ties and analogously each W -agent w has a linearly ordered preference list Lw of a subset
of U -agents. The majority of the terminology for stable matchings goes through for stable
b-matchings. v1 is acceptable for v2 if v1 is on Lv2 . Instead of saying that some agent or vertex
is single or free we will use the term unsaturated: agent v is unsaturated by a b-matching M
if degM (v) < b(v). A pair (u,w) is blocking for a b-matching M if (0) u and w are acceptable
to each other and (1) u is unsaturated or prefers w to one of W -agents of M(u) and if (2) w is
unsaturated or prefers u to one of U -agents of M(w). A b-matching M is said to be stable if it
does not admit a blocking pair. As previously we are interested in finding a stable b-matching
of largest size. Let us also note that if for each u in U we have b(u) = 1, then the problem is
known under the name Hospitals-Residents problem or one-to-many stable matching problem.
An approximation algorithm for stable b-matchings is constructed analogously to the algo-
rithm from the previous section. U -agents play the role of men and W -agents play the role of
women. Each U -agent u makes a proposal to each W -agent on Lu. Each W -agent w stores
information about U -agents currently matched with w in a priority queue. We translate the
notions from the previous section to the current setting as follows. If a saturated U -agent u
is matched with a W -agent w and there is at least one unsaturated W -agent w1 such that w
and w1 are equally good for u, then u and w are said to be unstable and w1 is said to be a
satellite of u. If e = (u,w) is such a non-M -edge that u,w are unsaturated and there is at
least one unsaturated W -agent w1 such that w and w1 are equally good for u, then e is called
special. We also have dangerous paths. Suppose we have a stable matching M , then a path
P = (w, u1, w1, u) is called dangerous if (u1, w1) is in M , (w, u1), (w1, u) are not in M , w
and u are unsaturated, u1, w1 are saturated and it is not true that u1 prefers w1 to w and w1
prefers u1 to u. Since (w, u1) is not blocking for M , w is not better for u1 than any of the
W -agents he is currently matched with and analogously u is not better for w1 than any of the
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U -agents he is currently matched with. Thus if P is dangerous, then either w,w1 are equally
good for u1 and (w, u1) is called an equal edge and P a masculine dangerous path, or u, u1
are equally good for w1 and (u,w1) is called an equal edge and P a feminine dangerous
path. Analogously we define blocking, unstable, f-equal and bad edges.
WheneverW -agent w receives a proposal from u, w accepts u if it is unsaturated or unstable
(then a proper exchange also takes place) or compares u to the worst u′ that is currently
matched with w. Finding the worst u′ that is currently matched with w takes O(log(b(w)))
time.
The running time of the algorithm isO(m log c), where c = min{max{b(v) : v ∈ U},max{b(v) :
v ∈W}} and m denotes the number of the edges and the approximation factor is 32 .
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